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Introduction

Vernon X. Miller*

Symposia on no-fault are common stuff. Ours is one of many, and there will
be more until we can hack out a consensus among lawmen and the rest of the
community. If editorial opinion is a criterion, the public is willing to buy nofault now. And the new dispensation has more than a foot in the doorway.
Legislatures in five states have approved it. Lawyers cannot duck it, no matter
how much they would like to, and they will have to engineer it.
Language is inadequate to describe the civil suit for damages. It is a tremendous, comprehensive, and wonderful institution. Even "institution" may be the
wrong word, but to the man in the street a lawsuit means the law. In torts the
civil suit has been flexible enough and loose enough that we have been able to
mold it to fit the exigencies of every generation. It is still growing although we
have never eliminated the ambiguities of the taught law. We get results, and we
come up with answers in thousands of instances with intricate combinations of
fact. We rely on appraisals and evaluations of professional and lay judges
according to community standards which we find in concrete police regulations
and the generalities of foreseeability and the reasonably prudent man. It takes
practical know-how to sift and divide the multiple issues of a case into questions
of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law.
With all of its flexibility and vitality, the civil suit for damages is only
approximately good. It has never covered all the ground. The basic standard
for conduct is too simplistic to support the intricate superstructure we have
erected on it. The basic standard itself is unreal. It sounds too good to be
challenged. Of course a man should pay for what he has done when he has
injured his neighbor intentionally or inadvertently. However, there is a big
"but" which made tort law academic until the last three generations. Most
people could not pay for their torts. We had to wait for vicarious liability,
railroad companies, proprietary functions for municipalities, the contingent fee
and finally, the automobile and the underwriting business to make tort litiga*
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tion practicable for lawyers. It is a bluffer's game to suppose that due process
and equal protection are inherent in the fault system and only in this system.
We have effected results we did not plan. We have created a world of "haves"
and "have-nots." We have stimulated the development of an under-writing
business to cover the costs of risk-bearing, and where there is the risk-bearing
possibility, we have let it affect the kind of structure we have erected on the basic
rule of conduct. In the little cases we have erased many of the distinctions
between the "haves" and "have-nots"; underwriters settle many of these regardless of fault. In the bigger cases we have multiplied the possibilities for
chance, and it is in these bigger cases where we have indulged our professional
inclinations for casuistry. The whole operation costs the community in money,
time, and court room efficiency, but it does support the adversary system.
Lawyers will not buy an alternative that destroys their professional careers.
Right now when the pressures for no-fault are intense, lawyers are caught on
the horns of a dilemma that challenges their ingenuity, their public spirit, and
their sense of history. Perhaps Keeton-O'Connell is the ideal compromise.
Many lawyers who oppose their plan have never read their book. Keeton and
O'Connell want to save the civil suit for the bigger cases. Of course, it could
be for a time at least after a legislature approves Keeton-O'Connell, that many
lawyers and many clients will want to believe that all cases are big. That could
defeat the purpose of the plan in spite of the opportunities it affords for contingent fees. The compulsory $10,000 basic protection plus the $5,000 optional
coverage for pain and suffering, with the $15,000 minimum for the civil suit,
is the heart of the plan. Even on the basic protection level some claimants will
need the services of lawyers, and the lawyers will be paid from the system.
There are other alternatives than Keeton-O'Connell. Some of them would
exclude the civil suit except as a penalty. Some of them have dollar limitations
that suggest the kind of inflexibility we know in workmen's compensation, and
this time we do not want a system geared to schedules that only a legislature
can change. In an introductory essay it is not practicable to criticize plans or
to offer alternatives, but you can pin down four basic factors which affect
decisions on no-fault. First, we are facing a crisis in the personal injury field
where we are pricing ourselves out of business. Secondly, and to summarize
what is outlined in preceding paragraphs, fault is inadequate as a measure of
social conduct. Third, our learning on damages is as artificial as the taught law
on fault. We have been able to live with that taught law on compensatory,
consequential, and punitive damages because we can tie up the loose ends
through the flexibility of the jury system. That the price of a tort should be
related to a defendant's conduct as a warning to others is as old as the action

of trespass. That price depends on the injured victim's needs and expense is as
old as the action on the case. The two approaches are intertwined in thousands
of cases. Paradoxical as it may seem, the jurors do a better job with the
intertwining than the lawyers do in explaining it.
Most of the damage factors we lawmen articulate are so subjective that we
can not trace their effects into a jury's verdict. When ceilings on judgmepts were
at $50,000,1 we could afford to put everything into the hopper. When we are
pricing ourselves out of business, we have to re-examine the whole package.
We cannot let ourselves be stymied on no-fault by the legalisms on damages.
Let me cite two special areas, pain and suffering and loss of consortium. There
is something of substance in each which legislatures cannot overlook when they
try to restructure any part of the personal injury field, but they will have to
look beyond the taught law and sample jury instructions to discover any part
of that substance.
Finally, we have to prophesy the effects of a new dispensation on the adversary system. The personal injury business may need drastic surgery, but the
community cannot afford to lose its tort lawyers. Personal injury practitioners
are bound to suffer from the first impact of the new system, but they will not
have to go out of business. Claims will not always be paid according to the
expectations of injured victims. There will be adversary proceedings, and there
will be court cases. Claimants will be represented, and the underwriters for the
system will have to cover the lawyers' fees even when the claimants lose.
Whether or not an adversary proceeding at the first level will be tried before a
special administrator or in a civil suit is a policy choice for a legislature.
Adversary proceedings can encompass many issues, the extent of economic loss,
allowing something for physical disability according to the schedules of the
scheme and effecting dispositions in death cases according to dependency and
need. There will be possibilies for third-party actions against manufacturers
although not in great quantity. The opportunities for lawyering will be many.
Lawyers are adjusting now to new conditions in the community, and they are
prospering.
Keeton-O'Connell is a practical scheme that saves much of the old system.
Perhaps we have to save that much in the automobile-using field to sell the new
plan, but no-fault as a concept is not something brand new in the law. We have
it in work injuries, in products liability, and it could be that we shall have it in
medical cases. Absolute liability can include a ceiling on benefits. For many
years damages in personal injury cases were so inadequate that lawyers had to
1. This essay is like an editorial, and I have not tried to annotate it. Nevertheless the proposition
I have marked is crucial, and it needs some explaining. I surveyed the case law thoroughly, and I
published my article in 1930. Miller, Assessment of Damages in PersonalInjury Actions, 14 MINN.
L. REV. 216 (1930).

exploit every possibility to produce enough to cover attorneys' fees and the costs
of convalescence. Since World War I1the pendulum has swung the other way.
Legislators must be realistic. The economy cannot absorb seven-figure judgments, although money damages in the big cases are never adequate. Members
of the injured victim's family and his neighbors must share with him the burden
of his hurt. The community can never make him whole. But legislators can be
practical. The automobile-using community can give enough to its victims to
cover economic loss, maybe something for physical disability, and the benefit
of a penalty when the conduct of the defendant warrants it. All that suggests a
lot of lawyering.
How to accomplish it taxes the ingenuity of statesmen. I am reminded of the
story about a grasshopper and an owl. The grasshopper hated to see winter
come. He wished he were a cricket who could find a warm hearth and live with
people. One of the grasshopper's neighbors heard him musing to himself, and
the neighbor told the grasshopper to visit the owl and ask for advice, which the
insect did. The owl said the problem was simple. The grasshopper should turn
himself into a cricket. When the grasshopper asked the owl how he could do
that, the wise old bird said, "You asked for advice, and I have given you a plan.
You implement it." The moral of the story: lawmen are not as bad off as the
grasshopper, but they will have to sweat.

